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Abstract 
 
We will be asking ourselves if the trading blocs created or renewed since the end of the 1980s 
favor the multilateralization of trade, and so constitute building or stumbling blocks. In a 
gravity model using panel data, we estimate a set of three regional dummies representative of 
intra-bloc trade, extra-bloc exports and extra-bloc imports. Taking the resulting three 
coefficients as a starting point, we propose an original typology of trade creations / diversions 
and of trading blocs. In applying it to our results, all the groups chosen as well as the Economic 
and Monetary Union, are shown to be building blocks. No trade diversion is noted, with the 
exception of an export diversion brought about by North American Free Trade Agreement. 
 
Key-words: trade integration, gravity model, trade creation / diversion, building / stumbling 
blocks 
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1  Introduction 
 
The debate on the relationship between regionalism and multilateralism saw a revival at the 
end of the 1980s, at a time when the Uruguay Round negotiations were a long time in coming 
to fruition and when free trade agreements were on the upturn. The World Bank (2005) 
registered the signing of over one hundred such agreements during the 1990s, by virtue of the 
creation or consolidation of zones of regional integration.  
 
In his examination of the effects that regional groups have on the global trading system, 
J.Bhagwati (1991) coined the terms building and stumbling blocks in reference to whether the 
groups were open or closed in character. The author considered regionalism to be 
discriminatory by nature and to be a cause of perverse effects. Not only liable to trigger inter-
bloc trade wars, it also favors the domination of the smaller states by the larger ones in each 
entity (J. Bhagwati, 1995). In addition, the complex, tangled network of preferential and free 
trade agreements referred to as the spaghetti bowl, engender further costs as a result of the 
different rules of origin involved in multiple membership (J. Bhagwati, D. Greenaway, A. 
Panagariya, 1998). L. Summers (1991) countered Bhagwati’s vision of things by emphasizing 
that intra-regional liberalization constitutes a step towards multilateralism and that it induces 
more trade creations than trade diversions. R. Baldwin (2004) found that those nations that 
were the most fervent advocates of GATT were also assimilated into regional blocs, and that 
the new wave of trade regionalism did not impede the conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
agreements. 
 
In Bhagwati’s approach (1991), a regional group constitutes a building block when it favors 
multilateralism and a stumbling block when it acts as an obstacle to it. From the point of view 
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of international trade, an agreement will have globalizing effects if it generates not only an 
internal trade flow but also the movement of trade with the rest of the world.  In this article, we 
consider whether the large groups created or renewed since the end of the 1980s have indeed 
contributed to an upsurge in multilateral trade and can therefore be deemed building blocks. 
Regionalism will be considered only in terms of trade, in accordance with the definition 
adopted by the WTO.    
 
The use of a gravity model is particularly well adapted to this objective. Since the initial 
studies carried out simultaneously by J. Tinbergen (1962) and P. Pöyhönen (1963), and then 
taken further by H. Linnemann (1966), gravity models have been used more and more by 
analysts of international trade. They provide a cogent explanation of bilateral trade flows, 
positively by the size of partner economies, and negatively by the geographical distance 
separating them, this distance being retained as the proxy for transport costs. Dummy control 
variables for the effect of regional agreements can be added to the basic equation. In this way, 
the additional trade attributable to the formation of a free trade area or a customs union can be 
determined in relation to the gravitational norm. Through the introduction of a set of three 
regional variables per agreement, it is possible to test simultaneously the effects of the 
groupings for intra-bloc trade, extra-bloc exports and extra-bloc imports. Such estimates 
require the use of panel data to check for potential unobservable factors that are specific to 
each pair of countries and which will have an influence on trade.  S. Baier and J. Bergstrand 
(2005) demonstrated that the absence of checks on the heterogeneity of pairs introduces a bias 
into the regional coefficient values.  
 
In order to evaluate the effects of the blocs that appeared or re-emerged during the new wave 
of regionalism, we use, for the period 1986-2005, a gravity model with panel data, comprising 
 3 
sets of three regional dummy variables. In respect of the earlier gravity approaches dealing 
with trade regionalism, listed in an OECD Working Paper (2001), in R. Adams et al. (2003) 
and in M. Cipollina and L. Salvatici (2007), we concern ourselves with the following points:  
 - With the aid of the two extra-regional coefficients, we highlight the potential surplus 
of export and/or import trade generated by the formation of the groups examined. A positive 
coefficient signals what, in a new terminology, will be called an external creation of exports 
and/or imports.  We consider as building blocks those groups for which the sum of the two 
parameters is positive.  
 - We establish a typology for trade creations / diversions and building / stumbling 
blocks identifiable from a gravity model with three regional coefficients, in accordance with 
their respective signs and values. 
-  So as to be able to judge the whole, we present a specification of the model which 
features a single set of three dummies, representing all the intra- and extra-bloc flows, for all 
groups. To the best of our knowledge, this specification has not as yet been tested within the 
framework of an approach comprising a gravity model with panel data using three regional 
variables.   
 
Within the limits of the available data in the UN-COMTRADE database, we select the 
principal regional agreements from the 1980s and 1990s, that is, those having either a large 
cumulative GDP or a large number of participants. Two categories of agreement are 
considered. The first are those that involve a deepening of a pre-existing integration process.  
The second are those agreements establishing a new grouping. Developing countries are 
implicated in both categories. At the same time, they implement trade reforms that integrate 
them into the multilateral system, which is one of the characteristics of “new regionalism” 
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(W.Ethier, 1998). A. Estevadeordal et al. (2001) gave an illustration of this for the specific case 
of Mercosur (Southern Common Market). 
 
In the first category, the European Community, through the introduction of a single market in 
1987, achieved one of the objectives of the Treaty of Rome by eliminating the remaining 
obstacles to the free movement of goods. CACM (Central American Common Market), created 
in 1960, put in place a customs union, the functioning of which was disrupted at the end of the 
decade by geopolitical tensions.  It was only in 1992 that the Central American states reinstated 
the union with the Guatemala Protocol. Similarly, the Andean Pact customs union1 (1969), for 
which the rate of tariff reductions had not been in line with expected timescales, was renewed 
in 1991 with the Barahona Agreement. In the second category, the agreements are either 
between developing countries or between developing and industrialized countries. NAFTA 
(North American Free Trade Association) and AFTA (Asean Free Trade Area) initiated their 
free trade zones in 1994 and 1993 respectively. Mercosur formed itself into a customs union 
with the Treaty of Asunción in 1991.  
 
All the blocs chosen for the study implemented a liberalization covering all goods, with some 
having removed non-tariff barriers. Even though there are exceptions for some sensitive 
products, these do not consist of simple preferential arrangements where tariff reduction is 
incomplete and/or limited to certain sectors. Other groups created in the 1990s, such as the 
Southern African Development Community (1992) or the South Asian Preferential Trade 
Agreement (1996), did not immediately commit to a complete intra-bloc liberalization.  For 
reasons of homogeneity, should the data have been available, it would have been incorrect to 
include these in our estimate. The Gulf Cooperation Council (1983) established a generalized 
                                                 
1
 The Andean Pact became the Andean Community of Nations (ACN) in 1997. 
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free trade area. However, in the absence of exhaustive data for the majority of its members for 
the period 1986-2005, we cannot include it in the study.  
 
While it is not a trade agreement per se, the EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) 
nonetheless exerts an influence on the intra- and extra-bloc trade of its members. It is, 
therefore, appropriate to assign a set of dummy variables to it. This enables us to verify, for 
this particular case, the theory that a single currency is a positive factor in trade between the 
countries having adopted it (J. Frankel and A. Rose, 1998). 
 
The second section of our analysis retraces gravity approaches to regionalism in demonstrating 
their evolution since the pioneering work of N. Aitken (1973). In the third section we will 
describe the data, the variables used and the specifications of the model we are adopting. Our 
results will be presented in the forth section of the paper and will be interpreted with regard to 
the typology of trade creations / diversions and building / stumbling blocks. The last section 
concludes. 
 
2  The Impact of free trade agreements in gravitational approaches 
 
Since the beginning of the 1970s, the spread of work measuring the impact of free trade 
agreements on trade has gone hand in hand with an evolution in the method used to evaluate it. 
The addition of a second and then third regional dummy variable in a gravity equation has 
refined both the interpretation of results and of trade creation and diversion effects. In studies 
carried out subsequent to the emergence of these two concepts (J. Viner, 1950), trade creations 
and trade diversions were measured by comparing the differences between observed flows and 
theoretical flows - an “anti-monde” without regionalism (B. Balassa, 1975). In the models 
 6 
which interest us, the “anti-monde” becomes the gravitational norm around which the effects 
that groupings have on trade are evaluated. 
 
Most studies carried out thus far have involved cross-sectional or pooling estimates, which do 
not consider individual effects in each pair of partner countries. Panel data analyses taking into 
account these specific effects have appeared only recently. In this section we will specify each 
time we refer to a study involving panel data.  That said, all the results we cite are significant.  
 
2-1 Studies involving a single regional dummy  
 
A first series of estimates dealing with large integrated groups uses only one regional dummy 
(D1), to test trade between its member countries. On the whole, they attest to an effect both 
positive and significant. In taking up a model like the ones used by  J. Tinbergen (1962) and H. 
Linnemann (1966) in conjunction with cross-sectional data (1961), N. Aitken (1973) showed 
that trade between EEC members (European Economic Community) is five times higher than it 
would have been had the EEC not been created2; this multiplicative factor of intra-bloc trade is 
only 1.2 in the case of EFTA (European Free Trade Association). Contrary to this, but for the 
year 1965, J. Bergstrand (1985) estimated that intra-EFTA trade was multiplied by 2, while 
intra-EEC trade was multiplied by 1.3 .   J. Frankel, E. Stein and S. Wei (1995), found the EEC 
result slightly higher in 1990. D. Greenaway (2000) reached the same multiplicative factor as 
did Bergstrand for the European Community, but for the whole of the period 1965-1993 and 
                                                 
2
 The log-log character of the gravity equation allows this type of interpretation from a coefficient α of D1. In 
subtracting member by member the initial equation  and  the same equation without the regional variable (with 
an associated trade flow T’ij), we obtain:   α = ln (Tij) – ln (T’ij), or  exp(α) = Tij / T’ij , i.e. the ratio of intra-bloc 
trade with and without agreement. Ceteris paribus, the exponential of the coefficient of the dummy variable is 
thus equal to the multiplicative factor of trade. As for N. Aitken, exp (1.6) = 4.95.       
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using country-specific effects panel data. Following the same method, L. Fontagné and S. 
Zignago (2007) obtained a figure of 2.4 for the period 1976-2000.   
 
In the two latter studies, the results found for EFTA diverge noticeably, with figures of 1.2 and 
2.7 respectively, whereas the estimate by M. Bussière, J. Fidrmuc and B. Schnatz (2005), using 
specific effects panel data, produces an intermediate result. NAFTA oscillates between a 
stimulation that is relatively weak (I. Cheng and H. Wall, 2005, Bussière et al., 2005) and one 
that is strong (Fontagné and Zignago, 2007) for trade between Canada, the United States and 
Mexico. Similarly, the studies already cited as using panel data, including those on some Latin 
American groups display, with varying intensity, the positive influence that Mercosur and the 
Andean community have on intra-bloc trade. C. Carrillo and C. Li (2004) found a 
multiplicative factor of about 1.6 for intra-ACN trade. Differences in results between authors 
are due not only to the distinct periods of analysis but also to the presence or absence of 
explanatory variables, such as “relative distance”, the importance of which we will highlight 
later. 
 
2-2 Studies involving 2 or 3 regional dummies  
 
In the work carried out using a single regional dummy, the specification gives no indication of 
the nature of the additional trade recorded relative to the gravitational norm: it could be either 
pure trade creation or a trade diversion, or it could be both at the same time. The addition of a 
second variable (D2) allows trade between bloc member countries and the rest of the world to 
be tested.  The variable is introduced into those models seeking to explain bilateral trade in its 
entirety (i.e. imports plus exports).  It takes the value 1 if one of the two countries is a bloc 
member and the other is not, otherwise it takes the value 0. In the case where the positive 
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coefficient of  D1 is superior to the absolute value of the negative coefficient of  D2, one part of 
the additional internal trade corresponds  to trade creation and the other to trade diversion, that 
is to say, a flow of goods substitutes for trade with the rest of the world. As was the case with 
the initial studies evaluating the effects of the EEC from both observed and theoretical flows, 
this method of evaluation does not take into account production costs. These latter remain basic 
to the concepts of trade creation and diversion as defined by J. Viner. To be able to conclude a 
positive effect in terms of welfare when trade creations exceed trade diversions, it is necessary 
to make the hypothesis that the former corresponds to a reduction in the unit cost for the 
importer.  
 
The analyses on the effects of regionalism comprising two dummy variables per agreement 
rarely attest to concurrent trade creation and diversion. Only T. Bayoumi and B. Eichengreen 
(1997) identify this scenario for the European Community, as do J. Frankel (1997) for NAFTA, 
and J. Gilbert et al. (2001) for the Andean Community and  Mercosur. The case most 
frequently encountered is that of trade creation occurring at the same time as a trade diversion 
qualified as negative (the D1 and D2 coefficients being positive). This diversion may be 
pronounced, as in Frankel (1997) and Q. Li (2000) for AFTA, and in D. Greenaway (2000) for 
AFTA and the European Community. It may be negligible as in the specific effects panel study 
carried out by J. Lee and I. Park (2005) for NAFTA, the CACM, the ACN and the EU 
(European Union).  
 
The D2 variable tests all bilateral trade with third-world countries. Where trade diversion is 
negative, the estimates are then not able to indicate whether the agreements have had an effect 
on extra-bloc exports or extra-bloc imports. Where trade diversion is positive, they do not 
indicate whether internal flows replace extra-regional exports or imports. The most recent 
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studies palliate this deficiency. They seek to explain the export flows of a country i towards a 
country j by differentiating the effects of agreements on exports to the rest of the world (DX 
variable) from their impact on imports coming from the rest of the world (DM variable). This 
identifies positive diversions of exports or imports (a positive coefficient for D1 superior in 
absolute value to the negative coefficient of DX or of DM), or a negative diversion (a positive 
coefficient of DX or of DM). In welfare terms, if we assume that production costs in the zone are 
superior to those of the rest of the world, positive import diversions are detrimental in that they 
induce a less efficient allocation of resources.   
 
As long as the coefficients of DX and DM are negative and each one exceeds the positive 
coefficient of D1 in absolute value, we find ourselves faced with a dilemma. It is impossible to 
know whether the additional internal trade due to the formation of a regional grouping replaces 
extra-zone exports or imports. The specific effects estimates carried out by C. Carrère (2004) 
thus present, for the case of the ACN, coefficients of imports and exports close to –1 and a 
coefficient representing intra-zone trade equal to 0.6. This aspect, not addressed in the earlier 
studies, will be dealt with here when we classify creations and diversions in function of the 
signs and values obtained for the three coefficients.  
 
Some studies introducing three regional dummy variables denote the presence of negative 
diversion of imports and exports while others denote positive diversions.  In R. Elliot and K. 
Ikemeto (2004), and in the individual effects panel study undertaken by N. Kien and Y. 
Hashimoto (2005), AFTA recorded negative diversions of imports and exports. The same was 
true for the European Community during the implementation of the Single Market (M. Endoh, 
1999, Elliot and Ikemeto, 2004). For Mercosur, the import diversions are positive for I. 
Soloaga and L. Winters (2001), E. Croce et al. (2004) and in the model of specific effects 
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presented by P. Tumbarello (2007), but they are negative in N. Kien and Y. Hashimoto (2005). 
ACN’s export diversions are mainly negative whereas those of NAFTA are positive (Elliot and 
Ikemeto, 2004, Kien and Hashimoto, 2005). 
 
3  Data, variables and variants of the model 
 
Following on from the work involving three regional dummy variables, we evaluate the effects 
of the principal free trade agreements of the 1980s and 1990s. The choice of the SITC2 
(Standard International Trade Classification Revision 2) version of the COMTRADE database 
allows us to go back as far as 1986 with complete data concerning bilateral exports for 50 
developed and developing countries. The list of countries appertaining to the groups under 
consideration is to be found in Appendix 1 3 . The agreements concerning the American 
continent bring together all their member countries, including those of the CACM, rarely 
considered in the earlier studies. With the exception of Hungary and Poland, the new members 
of the EU are not included due to a lack of exhaustive data for the whole of the period under 
study. The same is true for Burma, Brunei, Cambodia and Laos for AFTA. In all, the model 
detailed below explains 50 x 49 export flows from one country to another, which, when 
multiplied by the 20 years represented, gives a total of 49 000 observations.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Ten countries make up the sample without belonging to a group being estimated: Australia, China, South 
Korea, Hong-Kong, India, New Zealand, Norway, Japan, Switzerland, Turkey. 
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3-1 The choice of variables 
 
Just as it was developed in its most simple form by J. Tinbergen (1962) and H. Linnemann 
(1966), the gravity equation makes bilateral trade flows (T) dependent upon the product of the 
incomes (Y) of the two partner countries i and j, divided by the distance separating them (D): 
1 2
3
i j
i j
ij
Y Y
T A
D
β β
β=          (1) 
Where A, β1, β2  and  β3 are the parameters to be estimated. 
 
Using a log-linear form that allows interpretation of the coefficients as elasticities of trade flow 
with regard to the explanatory variables, we obtain: 
 
1 2 3ln( ) ln( ) ln( ln( )ij i j ijT Y Y Dα β β ) − β= + +        (2) 
 
This gravity equation is considered as one of the most stable and the most robust empirical 
relations in economics (T. Mayer, 2001). The main criticism leveled at it initially concerned its 
lack of theoretical foundations, being a simple intuition derived from the physical forces of 
attraction and repulsion.  By introducing transport costs into the model of monopolistic 
competition, P. Krugman (1980) countered this by arriving at a demand equation close to the 
gravity equation. Following J. Anderson (1979) and A. Deardorff’s lead (1995), other authors 
demonstrated that the neoclassical model of international trade is also compatible with the 
basic gravity model.  J. Bergstrand (1989) answered those who questioned the duplicity of the 
explanations. In developing a general equilibrium model based on two factors and two goods, 
one being homogenous and the other differentiated, he showed that the gravity model could be 
adapted to a framework of analysis mixing traditional and intra-industry specializations.  
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Empirically, it is possible to bring in variables that are sensitive to specialization type.  The 
absolute value of the difference in per capita GDP is used to test differences in factor 
endowment.  A positive sign for its coefficient reflects traditional trade, inter-industrial in 
nature. A negative sign favors the thesis of Linder (1961), which puts a rapprochement of 
income per capita as one of the determinants of intra-industry trade (J. Frankel, 1997). Linder’s 
hypothesis of the similarity of structures of national demand can be even better tested by the 
addition of a similitude of GDP variable.  
 
As did B. Baltagi et al. (2003) and L. De Benedictis et al. (2005), we bring in both of the 
variables described above (pcGDPdif and SIMIL), adopting the following measures for two 
partners i and j (using IMF4  data for GDP and per capita GDP): 
 
ln jiij
i j
GDPGDPpcGDPdif
POP POP
= −  
 
2 2
ln 1 jiij
i j i j
GDPGDPSIMIL
GDP GDP GDP GDP
    
 = − −      + +     
 
 
Another question requiring examination is that of the choice of distance variable, distance 
being a proxy for transport costs.  Caution is advised in its interpretation. The majority of 
studies use the geodesic distance between the political capitals of the partner countries, or 
between their economic capitals (the approach we have retained). This distance corresponds to 
the “great circle” measurement calculated from the latitudes and longitudes of the selected 
towns. However, transport network infrastructures do not follow a course as the crow flies and 
                                                 
4
 IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2007. 
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they bypass natural obstacles such as mountain ranges. The journey in kilometers may 
therefore be underestimated in the gravity equation. This is a case in point for the Andean 
Community of Nations, regarding land-based transport alone. The distance factor can equally 
be over-estimated, however, when there is a great deal of cross-boarder trade, as is a current 
situation in West Africa. In the end, transport costs are not purely a factor of distance. Other 
elements such as unloading and customs clearance fees or insurance premiums are also 
involved and are not necessarily correlated with distance in kilometers.   
 
Once the absolute distance between two countries has been controled, it is advisable to also 
take into account relative distance, i. e. that separating them from their other partners. Trade is, 
in fact, more intense between a pair of countries that are remote from the world’s largest 
economic centers than it is between two economies that are geographically close to them. We 
would therefore expect Australia and New Zealand to trade between themselves to a greater 
extent than would Austria and Portugal, even though the geographical distances between the 
two countries in each pair are similar. A. Deardorff (1995) was the first author to bring the 
relative distance variable into a gravity model. J. Polak (1996) and J. Harrigan (2001) showed 
the existence of an important bias when only the absolute distance variable was considered. J. 
Polak emphasized that the most biased coefficients were precisely those that measured the 
effects of trading blocs. His reasoning was based on some surprising results found in the 
studies by Frankel, Stein and Wei (1994 and 1995). Undertaken without the relative distance 
control, the studies indicate in particular the absence or low level of trade creation within the 
EEC.  
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As did S. Wei (1996), we will measure the relative distance of a country k (REMOTk) by the 
sum of the distances separating it from a partner l, weighted by the size of l’s GDP in the total 
world GDP (GDPWorld) :  
l
k kl
Worldl
GDPREMOT DIST
GDP
 
= × 
 
∑  
The relative distance variable retained in our equation for the couple (i , j)  is the logarithm of 
the average of the relative distances of the countries i and j.  
 
We also add the logarithm of the real bilateral exchange rate to the estimate, which brings a 
price variable into the model. Initiated by J. Bergstrand (1985), this practice allows the 
evolution of competitiveness to be tested (T. Bayoumi and B. Eichengreen, 1997). We 
calculate the real exchange rate5  from the nominal exchange rate and consumer price index 
data taken from the IMF (see Appendix 2). The other explanatory variables are dummies. The 
sharing of a common border (CONTIG) is likely to positively influence bilateral trade.  The 
same is true of sharing a common language (LANG), which is a proxy of cultural closeness and 
brings about a reduction in trade transaction costs. Finally, we introduce a set of three dummies 
representative of the exchange flows of the member countries of all the Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTA variables).  
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 The formula used for the calculation of real exchange rate (RERij) is the following: 
j
ij ij
i
CPI
RER NER
CPI
= ×   ,  where: 
NERij is the annual average indirect nominal value of country i’s currency expressed in country j’s 
currency  
  CPIj is the annual average consumer  price index of country  j 
              CPIi  is the annual average consumer price index of country i 
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3-2 The gravity equations estimated 
 
Using model (2) as its basis and giving a temporal dimension to most of the variables, the 
equation becomes: 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
10 11 12
ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
ln( ) ln( )
_ _ _
ijt it jt ij ijt ijt
ijt ijt ij ij
ijt ijt ijt ijt
X GDP GDP DIST REMOT pcGDPdif
SIMIL RER CONTIG LANG
RTA intra RTA X RTA M
β β β β β
β β β β
β β β
= α + + + + +
+ + + +
+ + + + ε (3) 
 
We define a second specification based on the equation (3), by adding to it a series of 20 
dummies corresponding to each of the years of the period under study. For reasons of 
simplification, we have not included these in the summary table (cf. Table 1). The first RTA 
variable tests intra-bloc trade. It takes the value 1 if the two countries i and j have signed the 
same agreement, and 0 otherwise. The second variable measures the impact of the groupings 
on those exports destined for the rest of the world. It takes the value 1 if country i is party to an 
agreement to which country j is not, and 0 otherwise. The third variable captures the effects on 
imports coming from the rest of the world. It takes the value 1 where i does not belong to the 
group of which j is a member, and 0 otherwise.  
 
The equation specification (3) comprising the three RTA variables will allow us to give an 
overall evaluation of the process of regional integration vis-à-vis multilateral trade. That said, 
however, we will use the following formulation to interpret the results detailed for each 
agreement:  
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1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14
ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
ln( ) ln( ) _ _
_ _ _
ijt it jt ij ijt ijt
ijt ijt ij ij ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt
X GDP GDP DIST REMOT pcGDPdif
SIMIL RER CONTIG LANG ACN intra ACN X
ACN M AFTA intra AFTA X
β β β β β
β β β β β β
β β β β
=α+ + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + + 15 16
17 18 19 20 21
22 23 24 25 26
27 28 29
_ _
_ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
_ _
ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt
AFTA M CACM intra
CACM X CACM M EU intra EU X EU M
EMU intra EMU X EMU M MERC intra MERC X
MERC M NAFTA intra NAFT
β
β β β β β
β β β β β
β β β
+
+ + + + + +
+ + + +
+ + + 30_ _ijt ijt ijtA X NAFTA Mβ+ +ε (4) 
 
The regional dummies are constructed according to the method used for the RTA variables, but 
are customized for each of the seven groups. In the cases where the agreement has yet to be 
implemented, there is no member country and the variables take the value 0. For a founder 
member, the method is applied from the year of the agreement’s coming into force, and for a 
new member, from that of its joining. The years in which the agreements were implemented, 
and the dates of their enlargement are shown in Appendix 1. The period for assessing the 
impact of the Single Market runs from 1987 to 1998, enabling the majority of its effects6 to be 
taken into account, and allowing the testing of the implementation of the EMU from 1999 
onwards whilst avoiding a correlation between the dummy variables.  
 
4  Trade effects of regional integration 
 
4-1 The estimate results 
 
The results of the three estimates are presented in Table 2. The first evaluates the intra and 
extra-bloc effects of the groupings with the regional trade agreement variables (RTA model 
(1)).  Fischer’s Test shows the presence of specific effects.  Thus, factors that are unobservable 
                                                 
6
 By 1998 more than 80% of directives regarding the implementation of the Single Market had already passed 
into national law of the member countries; when we transposed this statistic to 14 of the 15 member states, the 
figure reached  90% (European Commission, Tableau d’affichage du Marché unique, n° 2, May 1998). 
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and unchanging over time and that are specific to each couple of partner countries, for example 
historical, cultural, geopolitical or geographical, will have an influence on trade flows. The 
advantage of using country-specific effect models is that it enables this heterogeneity to be 
taken into account.  Moreover, not carrying out a check for unobservable factors would bring 
in a bias in the regional dummy coefficients. In the study by L. Fontagné and S. Zignago 
(2007), the multiplicative factor of intra-bloc trade diminishes by more than half when these 
factors are included. We continue the econometric process with a Hausman Test. This shows 
that the specific effects of the RTA model (1) are fixed and non-random.  
 
The second estimate (RTA model (2)) adds dummy variables representing the years for the 
period under study to the first model. The coefficients for these 20 variables are all positive and 
significant. Comparison of models (1) and (2) with their corresponding Fischer statistics, 
however, indicates that the first has a better global signification than the second. It is the first 
estimate that we retain for the interpretation of results, therefore. The third estimate (model (3) 
of Table 2) is identical to the first, the only exception being that it tests the trade agreements in 
a detailed manner and not as a whole. Its results will allow us to extract the creations and 
diversions of trade for the different groups and to determine if they constitute building or 
stumbling blocks.   
 
The inconvenience of country-specific effects is that they capture variables that are stable over 
time, and which can no longer be separately estimated, therefore.  In our case, these are 
variables of contiguity, common language and of distance.  In practically all of the studies 
undertaken, the corresponding coefficients are significant, positive for the first two and 
negative and close to one for the third (T. Mayer, 2001).  To estimate them separately would 
add nothing to our purpose, which is to do with regional variables. These latter change over the 
period 1986-2005, as the start of the implementation of agreements always takes place during 
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that period. In addition, certain groups have been subject to enlargement (Mercosur7, EU, 
EMU), in itself a further source of variation over time.  
 
In accordance with the traditional results of estimates on gravity models, the size of partners as 
reflected by their GDP has a tangible and very significant effect on their trade.  The coefficient 
of the real bilateral exchange rate, on the other hand, proves to be low and its sign contra-
intuitive. Relative distance stands out as being significant and highly explanatory of trade, 
confirming its necessary inclusion in such an equation. The variable indicating the difference 
in per capita GDP acts negatively. This follows Linder’s thesis, since trade diminishes in 
proportion to the increase in the difference in per capita income, but this effect is minimal due 
to the fact of a reduced coefficient. Moreover, the rapprochement of the absolute GDPs does 
not stimulate bilateral trade. On the contrary, the negative sign of the SIMIL variable reveals 
that trade intensifies in relation to the divergence in GDPs. 
 
Through the results given by the three dummy variables for the regional trade agreements, we 
are in a position to give an overall judgment on the new wave of regional integration. In the 
best specification of the model (1), it stimulates equally both intra and extra-bloc trade. Intra-
bloc trade is 39% higher than without regionalization, and exports and imports with the rest of 
the world are 16% and 20% higher, respectively. Since the end of the 1980s, the formation or 
consolidation of large regional groups has not only been of benefit to their internal trade flows 
but has also been a generator of multilateral trade.  
 
This first conclusion is verified and detailed, case by case, in the model (3) estimates. Let us 
examine the parameters of the intra-bloc dummies: they all come out significant and positive. 
                                                 
7
 Mercosur enlarged by the creation of a free trade area with Chile (1996) and with Bolivia (1997). 
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An average of the coefficients found in the previous studies, irrespective of method used and 
period studied, features in the meta-analysis of M. Cipollina and S. Salvatici (2007). Our 
estimates correspond to a quarter of that average for the EU, a third for the CACM, half for 
AFTA, NAFTA and Mercosur, and slightly below the average for ACN. It is logical that we 
should obtain lower coefficients as practically none of the studies included in the meta-analysis 
take the unobservable factors into account. The EU’s weak internal coefficient seems to 
suggest that the constitution of the Single Market is less propitious to the development of 
commercial interdependence than was the EEC. The results for the two South American 
customs unions attest to ACN having a greater influence on intra-bloc trade than does 
Mercosur. The beginning of the period chosen for the Andean Community, however, 
corresponds to the adoption of a short timescale for the implementation of the customs union, 
even though it was already partially in operation between Argentina and Brazil before the 
signing of the Treaty of Asunción. Comparable to that of  Mercosur, the impact of CACM’s 
customs union allowed it to return to having the degree of intra-regional trade reached at the 
beginning of the 1980s (O. Dabène, 1998). The intermediary results for NAFTA and AFTA 
emphasize that their status as a free trade zone does not constitute a discriminatory criterion 
with regards to other modes of integration. 
 
We also test the effects of the European single currency on the trade of the EMU member 
countries for the period 1999-2005.  J. Frankel and K. Rose were the first to put forward the 
idea that monetary union optimality is achieved in an endogenous manner. Through empirical 
studies, they show that the use of a common currency is at the heart of a reinforcement of trade 
links (A. Rose, 2000), this being a factor for better synchronization of business cycles (J. 
Frankel and A. Rose, 1998). The first proposition can be verified in the case under study, since 
the trade between members of the Eurozone would be 16% higher than it would have been had 
the single currency not existed.  Our result extends the almost identical ones of A. Micco et al. 
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(2003) and H. Flam and H. Nordstrom (2003), whose study periods only cover four years of 
the EMU’s lifetime. Their results are also obtained from a fixed specific effects panel, but 
involve around twenty industrialized countries only.    
 
 
4-2 Do the groups generate trade creations / diversions and do they constitute 
building or stumbling blocks? 
 
Using the sets of intra and extra-bloc coefficients obtained in the model (3) as our basis, we are 
now going to determine the trade creations / diversions imputable to the different groups, 
asking ourselves if they constitute building or stumbling blocks.  First of all, we draw up a 
typology of the creations / diversions identifiable from a gravity model using 3 regional 
variables, as well as a typology of the trading blocs (Tables 3 and 4). 
 
The first table presented, links the designation of each category of creation and diversion to the 
corresponding trade effects. The second configures these in function of the respective signs and 
values of the intra-bloc (d1) and extra-bloc (dX and dM) coefficients.  Let us consider the 
situation where d1 is higher than zero with a positive dX and/or dM. In previous studies this has 
sometimes been qualified as a negative export and/or import diversion.  Instead, we substitute 
the expression “trade creation of exports and/or imports”, which better describes the boosting 
effect these new groups have on multilateral trade.  
 
As long as dX and dM are positive, the group constitutes a building block. If they are negative, 
it is a stumbling block. When the sum of dX and dM is positive with one of the two coefficients 
being negative the group constitutes a building block, the extent of export creations being 
superior to the fall in imports, or import creations exceeding the reduction in exports. The few 
studies that draw up a net balance of trade resulting from integration do so from the three 
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regional variables. Only P. Tumbarello (2007) systemizes the summation of the three 
coefficients to all the groups under examination. However, there remains the risk of 
considering as building blocks those groups which favor trade between member countries 
while destroying multilateral trade (d1 > ׀ dX + dM ׀ with negative dX and dM). It is for this 
reason that we draw up the net trade balance from the two extra-regional coefficients.  
 
It should be noted that trade diversions occur to the extent that an intra-bloc trade flow may 
replace an extra-bloc flow. With two extra-regional variables, the designation of the type of 
diversion may prove to be problematical. When the two external coefficients are negative and 
their sum is higher in absolute value than the internal coefficient (last line of Table 4), it is 
impossible to determine the respective proportion of export and import diversion, or even the 
presence of one or the other when ׀dX׀  and ׀dM׀ are both superior to d1. 
 
Let us now examine Table 2’s results of the model (3) in the light of the interpretative 
framework given in Table 4. No regional group induces an import trade diversion. With the 
exception of NAFTA, no group is the source of an export diversion. All the groups give rise to 
import trade creations and, for six out of the seven, to export trade creations. In every case, the 
balance of the two extra-bloc effects of the bloc formation is positive. Our results, therefore, 
place each one as a building block, favorable to both trade regionalization and globalization.   
 
The work of N. Kien and Y. Hashimoto (2005) is well suited for comparison as it includes a 
period of study and a number of countries close to our own. Moreover, it identifies specific 
fixed effects in a panel estimate. The signs and values of the coefficients for NAFTA indicate 
here also the presence of export trade diversions. Observation of the figures for the North 
American countries would tend to suggest that these diversions concern the agricultural and 
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mining sectors8. As for AFTA, the two authors present results equally close to our own, in 
particular for the values for the intra-bloc and export coefficients. Trade between AFTA 
members would be 1.7 higher than it would have been had the bloc not been created, and sales 
to the rest of the world would be almost doubled. This vigorous export trade, which goes hand 
in hand with the stimulation of internal trade, is to be found in all the groups making up the 
model (3), although to a lesser degree and with the exception of  NAFTA.  
 
The dynamic effects of regional integration are frequently put forward to explain the 
simultaneous growth of intra-bloc trade and exports to the rest of the world. The creation of 
regional markets gives rise to increased competition, encourages innovation and allows the 
achievement of economies of scale, in accordance with mechanisms developed for the 
European Community in the first Emerson Report (M. Emerson et al., 1990). The new 
regionalism is accompanied in every case by a gradual decrease in customs duties and 
consequently adds an international element to the new competition. In the developing countries, 
the implementation of new groupings coincides with open trade reforms and the politics of 
attracting direct foreign investment. This justifies the expression “open regionalism” often used 
by the Economic Commission of United Nations for Latin America (ECLAC, 1994).  
 
Taking as a starting point the CHELEM9 database, we can observe that the sectors where 
internal trade and external sales increase concurrently are mainly those reputed to have strong 
potential for economies of scale. Included here10 are organic chemical and plastic products for 
                                                 
8
 Since NAFTA’s inception, exports of animal feed (United States), cereal (United States, Canada) and refined 
petrol (Mexico) declined towards the rest of the world but increased towards partner countries (observations 
made by the author based on data from the CHELEM database - cf. note 9). 
 
9
 The CHELEM database (Comptes Harmonisés sur les Echanges et l’Economie Mondiale) of the CEPII (Centre 
d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales) proposes a breakdown of  71 product categories.  
 
10
 This description does not concern CACM countries, which are not represented in CHELEM’s trade data. 
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all the groups, vehicles and automobile components for all groups excepting the ACN, the 
aeronautical industry and pharmaceuticals for the EU, and  refined petrol for Mercosur and  the 
ACN. Electronic components and computer and telecommunications equipment are sometimes 
represented, more particularly for the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. The 
AFTA countries benefit from a dense network of multinational firms that have undertaken 
efficient reorganization of their production so as to favor internal liberalization (M. Fujita, 
2001). In facilitating the intra-bloc division of work between subsidiaries, trade regionalism 
acts as a vector of competitiveness on a multilateral scale.  In one of his conclusions, W. Ethier 
(1998) underlines that the attraction of direct investments  exerted by the creation of large 
regional markets constitutes a means by which the emerging countries enter into competition 
with the aim of integrating themselves into the multilateral system.    
 
5  Conclusion 
 
Our panel data estimate using a gravity model comprising three regional dummies ends with 
convergent conclusions. Integration stimulates the intra-bloc trade of member countries, as it 
does their extra-bloc exports and extra-bloc imports.  This general result is found to be true 
from case to case, with the exception of NAFTA, which induces an export trade diversion in 
substituting sales to the rest of the world with internal flows.  The other trading blocs and the 
EMU all give rise to export trade creations. All the groups display import trade creations. As 
NAFTA is at the origin of a positive net balance for its trade with the rest of the world, all the 
groupings constitute building blocks. If the recent wave of regionalism stimulates trade 
between member countries, it is by the same token a source of trade multilateralization.  
Moreover, and for AFTA in particular, it seems to favor the insertion of member countries into 
the world economy, by simultaneously boosting intra-bloc and worldwide export trade.  
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The open character of the trading blocs can be seen in their successive enlargements and/or in 
their participation in projects encompassing vast free trade areas. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
J. Bhagwati (1993) emphasized that regional groups could only constitute building blocks 
within the framework of a continual expansion leading them towards global free trade. The 
theorist behind the “domino effect” (R. Baldwin, 2003) highlights the topicality of this trend (R. 
Baldwin, 2006). Even before the enlargement of 2004, the creation of the Single Market had an 
attraction effect on the countries belonging to the European Free Trade Association. On the 
impetus of China’s joining the WTO, the AFTA member countries signed a free trade 
agreement with it, which in turn set off a series of bilateral negotiations with Japan and South 
Korea. The free trade agreement project between the United States and Mexico resulted in 
NAFTA and in the announcement of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, and Brazil and 
Argentina extended their association to include their Paraguayan and Uruguayan neighbors. 
The creation of the South American Community of Nations (2004) and the opposing 
negotiations of the Free Trade Area of the Americas nonetheless attest to a wish on the part of 
Mercosur and ACN members to exploit the dynamic effects of sub-continental integration as a 
matter of priority.    
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Table 1  Variable denomination and content  
 
 
Xijt 
 
is the annual export flow in current dollars from country i to country j 
 
GDPit and GDPjt are the respective gross domestic products in dollars for countries i and j 
 
DISTij is the geodesic distance in kilometers separating the economic capitals of country i and 
country j 
 
REMOTijt is the average of relative distances of countries i and  j 
 
pcGDPdifijt is the absolute value of the difference of the per capita GDPs of countries i and j 
  
SIMILijt is an indicator of the similarity in size of the GDPs of countries i and j 
 
RERijt  is the real indirect quotation of  i’s currency expressed in j’s currency 
 
CONTIGij is the dummy contiguity variable with value 1 if the two partners have a common border  
and 0 if they do not 
 
LANGij is a dummy  variable that takes value 1  if the two partners share the same language and  
0 if they do not 
 
RTA_intraijt 
RTA_Xijt 
RTA_Mijt 
assesses intra-bloc trade regardless of the group under consideration 
assesses extra-bloc exports of the member countries of regional groups 
assesses extra-bloc imports of the member countries of regional groups 
 
ijtε  
 
is the error term 
 
 
Note: in the equation specification (4), the 3 RTA variables disappear to make way for a set of the same three variables 
for each of the 7 agreements. 
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Table 2  Intra and extra-bloc effects of trade agreements (specific effects panel) 
 
RTA Models   Variables (1) (2) 
Regional groups 
model (3) 
Exporter GDP (ln(GDPit)) 
 
0,53*** (31,29) 0,38*** (16,94) 
 
0,48*** (26,88) 
Importer GDP (ln(GDPjt)) 
 
0,95*** (55,59) 0,80*** (35,42) 
 
0,97*** (53,94) 
 
Distance (ln(DISTij)) 
 
- 
- 
- 
Relative distance (ln(REMOTijt)) 
 
1,00*** (3,91) 0,96*** (3,04) 1,09*** (4,25) 
Difference of the per capita GDPs (ln(difGDPpcijt)) 
 
-0,02** (-2,56) -0,01* (-1,83) -0,02*** (-2,61) 
Similarity in size of the GDPs (ln(SIMILijt)) 
 
-0,31*** (-14,92) -0,26*** (-12,11) -0,30*** (-14,19) 
Bilateral real exchange rate (ln(RERijt)) 
 
-0,02*** (-3,70) -0,02*** (-3,71) -0,02*** (-3,97) 
Contiguity (CONTIGij) 
 
- - - 
Common language (LANGij) - - - 
    
Regional trade agreements_intra-bloc (RTA_intraijt) 
Regional trade agreements_exports (RTA_Xijt) 
Regional trade agreements_imports (RTA_Mijt) 
0,33*** (11,32) 
0,15*** (11,10) 
0,18*** (13,37) 
0,32*** (10,68) 
0,14*** (10,00) 
0,17*** (12,12) 
- 
- 
- 
    
Andean Community_intra-bloc (ACN_intraijt) 
Andean Community_exports (ACN_Xijt) 
Andean Community_imports (ACN_Mijt) 
 
 
 
 
0.98*** (10.24) 
0.14*** (4.63)  
0.24*** (7.97) 
Asean Free Trade Area_intra-bloc (AFTA_intraijt) 
Asean Free Trade Area_exports (AFTA_Xijt) 
Asean Free Trade Area_imports (AFTA_Mijt) 
 
 0.53*** (5.71) 
0.66*** (22.48) 
0.07** (2.27) 
    
Central American Market_intra-bloc (CACM_intraijt) 
Central American Market_exports (CACM_Xijt) 
Central American Market_imports (CACM_Mijt) 
  
0.30*** (4.00) 
0.11*** (3.87) 
0.11*** (4.05) 
 
European Union_intra-bloc (EU_intraijt) 
European Union_exports (EU_Xijt) 
European Union_imports (EU_Mijt) 
 
 
 0.09** (2.36) 
0.11*** (4.28) 
0.04* (1.76) 
 
Eurozone_intra-bloc (EMU_intraijt) 
Eurozone_exports (EMU_Xijt) 
Eurozone_imports (EMU_Mijt) 
  
0.15 *** (3.19) 
0.07*** (2.71) 
0.05* (1.70) 
 
Mercosur_intra-bloc (MERC_intraijt)  
Mercosur_exports (MERC_Xijt) 
Mercosur_imports (MERC_Mijt) 
  
0.32*** (4.28) 
0.06** (2.18) 
0.28*** (10.67) 
 
North American Area_intra-bloc (NAFTA_intraijt) 
North American Area_exports (NAFTA_Xijt) 
North American Area_imports (NAFTA_Mijt) 
 
 0.45*** (2.73) 
-0.13*** (-3.69) 
0.21*** (6.00) 
    
Intercept 
 
-23,15*** (-9,96) - 19,32*** (-6,50) - 23,48*** (-10,12) 
Number of observations 
Number of groups / number of years 
Fischer Test (specific effects) 
Hausman Test, chi2 (12) (fixed effects)  
R2  within 
49 000 
 2450 ; 20 
50,12*** 
1838*** 
0,32 
49 000 
 2450 ; 20 
49,32*** 
1769*** 
0,32 
49 000 
2450 ; 20 
43,69*** 
1215*** 
0,33 
 ***, ** and * denote that variables are statistically significant at 1%, 5 % and 10% respectively. 
 
 (1) Model assessing the Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) together. 
 (2) Model (1) with 20 temporal dummy variables, not reported, all coefficients being positive and significant.  
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Table 3   Typology of trade creations and diversions 
 
Acronym Designation Effect of regional grouping 
ITC Intra-bloc trade creation Stimulating effect on trade between partners 
XTC Export trade creation Stimulating effect on exports to the rest of the world  
MTC Import trade creation Stimulating effect on imports from the rest of the world  
XTD Export trade diversion Exports to the rest of  world are replaced by intra-bloc trade  
MTD Import trade diversion Imports from the rest of  world are replaced by intra-bloc trade  
 
 
 
 
Table 4   Creations / diversions and the typology of the blocs 
 
Sign of regional coefficients  
d1 
Intra-bloc 
trade 
dX 
Extra-bloc 
exports 
dM 
Extra-bloc 
imports 
 
EFFECTS of TRADE CREATION / 
DIVERSION* 
 
BUILDING / STUMBLING 
BLOCK 
+ + + ITC, XTC and MTC Building block  
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
If d1 > ׀dM׀ : ITC, XTC, MTD  
If ׀dM׀ > d1 : XTC, MTD  
  Building block if dX > ׀dM׀ or 
stumbling block if ׀dM׀ > dX  
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
If d1 > ׀dX׀ : ITC, XTD, MTC  
If ׀dX׀ > d1 : XTD, MTC  
  Building block if Md  > ׀dX׀ or 
stumbling block if ׀dX׀ > Md  
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
If d1 > ׀dX + dM׀ : ITC, XTD and  MTD 
If  ׀dX + dM׀ > d1 : XTD and/or MTD 
 
Stumbling block 
 
       *Cf. Table 3 for the meaning of acronyms 
            
Note: if the sign of d1 is negative, an occurrence rarely seen in the empirical literature, there cannot be a trade diversion, which 
implies a substitution of extra-bloc flow by an intra-bloc flow resulting from the formation of the group.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Regional groups and member countries included in the estimate 
 
Acronyms  Designation  Implemen-
tation (1) 
Type of 
agreement 
Member countries (2) 
 
 
ACN Andean   Community  
of Nations 
1992 Customs union Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela 
AFTA Asean Free trade area 1993 Free trade area Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand 
CACM Central      American  
Common Market  
1993 Customs union Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama 
EU European Union 1987 Single market Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United 
Kingdom, Austria  (1995), Finland (1995), 
Sweden (1995), Hungary (2004), Poland 
(2004)  
EMU Economic         and  
Monetary Union 
1999 Monetary 
union  
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Greece (2001) 
MERCOSUR Southern Common 
Market 
1991 Customs union Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile 
(1996), Bolivia (1997) 
NAFTA North American Free  
Trade Association  
1994 Free trade area Canada, Mexico, United States 
 
 (1) Year of the agreement’s coming into force (AFTA, EMU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR), or year of relaunching or consolidation of 
the group (CAN, CACM, EU).  
 
(2) Due to a lack of exhaustive data for the whole period under study (1986-2005),  Burma, Brunei, Cambodia and Laos (AFTA 
members) are not included in the estimate. The same is true for new members joining the European Union in 2004, with the 
exception of Hungary and Poland. In the case of an enlargement, the entrance year appears into brackets.  
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 2   
 
Data sources  
 
 
                          DATA 
 
 
                            SOURCES 
 
   Bilateral export flows   United Nations - COMTRADE  database  SITC2 (Standard 
International Trade Classification Revision 2) 
   GDP in current dollars 
   Per capita GDP in current dollars 
   CPI (Consumer price index), annual average 
IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2007 
  
   NER (Nominal exchange rate), annual average               IMF, International Financial Statistic 
   Distance, contiguity, common language “Distances” database,  CEPII (Centre d’Etudes Prospectives 
et d’Informations Internationales), Paris 
 
 
